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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tyler Sorensen contends the district court erred in Docket No. 47014 when it denied his
motion to suppress because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic
stop. As such, this Court should reverse the order denying his motion and remand that case for
further proceedings.
Mr. Sorensen also asserts the district court abused its discretion in both Docket No.
47014 and 47015 by imposing excessive sentences. As such, this Court should, alternatively,
remand both cases for a new sentencing determination.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on patrol, Officer Grisham saw a truck drive by which had the cover for one of its
rear lights broken out. (Suppression Tr., p.8, Ls.9-13.) 1 The exposed bulb had been painted over
with red spray paint. (Suppression Tr., p.8, Ls.17-20) However, the officer testified he could
see a lot of white light showing between the uneven coat of paint.

(Suppression Tr., p.8,

Ls.17-22.) Based on that observation, he pulled out behind the truck with the intent of pulling it
over.
As he did so, Officer Grisham also noted the sticker on the rear license plate appeared to
be expired. (Suppression Tr., p.8, Ls.13-15.) He asked dispatch to verify the registration status
of the truck. (Suppression Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.) Apparently, there was some confusion, and dispatch
looked up two different license plate numbers (

).

1

(See Suppression

While the transcripts in this case are all provided in one electronic document, some are
presented four-to-a-page, while others are presented one-to-a-page. Since each transcript is
independently paginated, citations to the transcripts will identify which hearing (suppression,
change of plea, or sentencing) the transcript was from.

1

Tr., p.20, L.17 - p.21, L.3 (the officer testifying that he had only called in one number, and that
any disparity may have been the result of dispatch mishearing him as he read off the number).)
None of that conversation was recorded by the officer's dash camera. (See generally Exhibit A,
0:00-1:38.)2 After dispatch responded that the truck's registration was expired, Officer Grisham
pulled the truck, which was being driven by Mr. Sorensen, over. (Suppression Tr., p.9, Ls.2-16.)
Mr. Sorensen moved to suppress all the evidence from the stop, arguing there had not
been reasonable suspicion to stop his truck. In regard to the taillight issue, defense counsel
argued the video showed there were two different shades of red light, but no white light,
emanating from the truck's taillights, and that did not violate the relevant statute. (Suppression
Tr., p.24, Ls.15-18.)

He submitted the expired registration issue without further comment.

(Suppression Tr., p.24, Ls.23-25.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, fmding the
officer's testimony credible on both issues. (See Suppression Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7, p.29, Ls.1-10.)
During the stop, Mr. Sorensen admitted his driver's license was suspended. Officers tried
to verify whether his passenger had a valid license, so that she might drive the truck away after
they issued a citation to Mr. Sorensen. (47014 R., p.34.) 3 She told officers she did not have her
license with her, but gave a name and date of birth. (47014 R., p.34.) However, the information
she gave did not return as valid. (47014 R., p.34.) Officers also became suspicious that the
passenger was the same person who had a restraining order against Mr. Sorensen.

(47014

R., p.34.) Another officer who was familiar with both Mr. Sorensen and J.M.H., and who knew

2

Although Exhibit A contains numerous dash camera and body camera videos, the parties only
played the first minute and thirty-eight seconds of Officer Grisham's dash camera video at the
hearing on Mr. Sorensen's motion to suppress. (See Suppression Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.3; see
also Suppression Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.6.)
3
Since the records provided for the two cases are different, citations thereto will include the
relevant docket number. The electronic documents provided which contain the transcripts and
the confidential exhibits are the same in both case files.
2

they were often together despite the restraining order, came to the scene and recognized the
passenger as J.M.H. 4 (47014 R., p.29.) Officers began demanding that both Mr. Sorensen and
J.M.H. get out of the truck, but Mr. Sorensen drove away from the stop instead, and a chase
ensued. (47014 R., p.34.)
Ultimately, Mr. Sorensen stopped, was arrested, and was charged in Docket No. 47014
with eluding, battery on an officer, resisting arrest, driving without permission, and no insurance
for his actions during the traffic stop, as well as several violations of the no-contact order. 5
(47014 R., pp.84-89.) He was charged with several other violations of the no-contact order in
Docket No. 47015 when he responded to messages sent by J.M.H. to him while in the jail. (See
47015 R., pp.36-39; Sentencing Tr., p.20, Ls.3-15.)
Mr. Sorensen subsequently entered a conditional plea pursuant to a global plea
agreement. 6 (47014 R., pp.146-48; 47015 R., pp.71-73; Change of Plea Tr., p.20, Ls.18-19
(clarifying that the plea was, indeed, conditional on Mr. Sorensen's ability to challenge the
decision on his motion to suppress).) Specifically, he agreed to plead to one count of eluding in
Docket No. 47104, and to any two of the allegations of violating the no-contact order from either
case. (47014 R., p.146; 47015 R., p.71.) Mr. Sorensen ultimately decided to plead to two of the
no-contact order charges from Docket No. 47015. (Change of Plea Tr., p.28, L.10 - p.29, L.20.)

4

J.M.H. subsequently told police that she and Mr. Sorensen had been getting ready to leave for
Colorado together when the officer pulled them over. (47014 R., p.32.)
5
J.M.H. was also placed under arrest when officers found methamphetamine in her purse. (See
47014 R., p.35.)
6
The district court suggested making this a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970), so as to protect Mr. Sorensen's Fifth Amendment rights, in the event he was
successful on his appellate challenge to the decision on his motion to suppress. (Change of Plea
Tr., p.25, L.18 - p.26, L.10.) Still, Mr. Sorensen did express remorse for his actions, and defense
counsel noted Mr. Sorensen accepted responsibility for them. (See PSI, p.6; Sentencing
Tr., p.18, Ls.6-7, p.19, Ls.1-10.)
3

He also agreed to pay restitution related to any of the charges. 7 (Change of Plea Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and not to pursue any additional
charges or enhancements. (47014 R., pp.146-47; 47015 R., pp.71-72.) The State also agreed to
concur with the presentence investigation (PSI) report's recommendation as to sentence, to not
make a recommendation in regard to whether to run the sentences concurrent or consecutive, and
all other terms were left open. (47014 R., p.147; 47015 R., p.72.)
The PSI noted that Mr. Sorensen only had one prior adult felony conviction, and it was
from 2005. (PSI, p.15.) 8 Though the original underlying sentence on that charge was only for a
term of three years, Mr. Sorensen ultimately served periods of probation interspersed with two
periods of retained jurisdiction (one in 2008 and one in 2013) before being finally released in
2014. (PSI, pp.9-10, 15.)
The PSI also noted that Mr. Sorensen lost two children in infancy in 2007 and 2008, and
he stated "I haven't really dealt with it" yet. (PSI, p.18.) In addition, Mr. Sorensen lost his
brother while they were living together in 2009, and he lost his first wife in 2013.

(PSI,

pp.16-17.) The PSI indicated that previous reports from the Department of Correction suggested
Mr. Sorensen had received some sort of mental health treatment in the past, but it did not give
any specifics about what that treatment had included or identify what diagnoses had been made
in that regard. (See PSI, p.19; see generally PSI (no prior reports from IDOC were attached to
the PSI).) No other mental health evaluations were conducted pursuant to this case because the
GAIN evaluator explained a GAIN evaluation would not have been appropriate given the

7

The allegation of battery on an officer arose from the fact that one of the officers' feet was hit
as Mr. Sorensen drove away from the scene and the restitution request dealt with the costs of
evaluating his foot for a "minor injury." (See 47014 R., pp.30, 162-66.)
8
Citations to PSI are to the electronic document "Appeal - Confidential Documents," and use
the electronic page number.
4

amount of time Mr. Sorensen had been incarcerated on this case. (PSI, p.25; see generally PSI;

see also 47014 R., p.175 (ordering Mr. Sorensen receive 406 days of credit for time already
served in this case).)
Defense counsel ultimately recommended the district court award credit for time served
and impose a period of probation on Mr. Sorensen, or alternatively, retain jurisdiction. 9
(Sentencing Tr., p.24, Ls.19-20, p.25, Ls.7-10.) He noted that the rider program had changed
significantly in the time since Mr. Sorensen's last period of retained jurisdiction. 10 (Sentencing
Tr., p.25, Ls.18-25.)

The district court refused to follow that recommendation, concluding

circumstances did not warrant probation or a third period of retained jurisdiction despite the
change in the available programs. (Sentencing Tr., p.33, L.25 - p.34, p.9.)
Instead, the district court imposed unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed,
on each of the charges to which Mr. Sorensen had pled. (Sentencing Tr., p.35, Ls.8-9, p.36,
Ls. I 0-13.) It ordered the two sentences for the no-contact order violations be run concurrent
with each other, but consecutive to the sentence for eluding. (Sentencing Tr., p.35, Ls.10-15.)
The result was an aggregate sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (Sentencing Tr., p.35,
Ls.16-19.)

Mr. Sorensen filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgments of

conviction. (47014 R., pp.174, 181; 47015 R., pp.93, 97.)

9

Defense counsel did not request a psychological evaluation at that time. (See generally Tr.)
See, e.g., Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho prisons halt treatment program that actually was leading to
more recidivism, THE
SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Sept. 18, 2015, available at
https://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2015/sep/18/idaho-prisons-halt-treatment-programactually-was-leading-more-recidivism/ (specifically discussing the therapeutic community rider
program).
10

5

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred in Docket No. 47014 by denying Mr. Sorensen's motion
to suppress.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences on
Mr. Sorensen in both cases.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Docket No. 47014 By Denying Mr. Sorensen's Motion To Suppress
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated - when a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's fmdings of fact
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 734 (Ct. App. 2018). The
power to assess credibility of witnesses during a suppression hearing is also vested in the trial
court.

Id.

A traffic stop is only permissible if the officer has reasonable and articulable

suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to the traffic laws. See, e.g., State v. Roe, 140
Idaho 176, 180 (Ct. App. 2004).
Mindful of the district court's determination that the officer's testimony about his reasons
for stopping the truck was credible, Mr. Sorensen maintains that there was no reasonable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop on either basis the officer identified for the reasons argued in
the district court. Specifically, the video from Officer Grisham's dash camera shows the taillight
in question was emanating a different shade of red light, not white light, and so, did not violate
the relevant statute.

(Suppression Tr., p.24, Ls.15-18; see generally Exhibit A, 0:00-1:38.)

Additionally, Officer Grisham' s testimony was not clear as to which license plate number
returned as expired - Mr. Sorensen's or the other one apparently run by dispatch.

(See

Suppression Tr., p.20, L.17 - p.21, L.3.) As such, this Court should reverse the order denying his
motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.

7

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences On Mr. Sorensen In
Both Cases
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, 103
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the
standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion). The governing criteria,
or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded

on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164
Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320

8

(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
In this case, the mitigating factors demonstrate that a more lenient sentence was
appropriate.

Mr. Sorensen's record shows an ability to be at least partially successful in

treatment programs, as he has completed two periods of retained jurisdiction and served several
years on probation between those periods of retained jurisdiction.

(See PSI, pp.9-10.)

His

failures on probation also appear to coincide with traumatic events in his life - the deaths of his
children, his brother, and his first wife. (Compare PSI, pp.9-10, with PSI, pp16-17.)
As such, this record indicates that Mr. Sorensen is capable of being successful on
probation, if the underlying issue is actually addressed. The problem is that, despite the PSI's
assertion that some sort of mental health treatment was provided at some unidentified point,
Mr. Sorensen still has not, by his own admission, "really dealt with" the death of his two infant
children. (PSI, p.18.) One such loss is traumatizing, and Mr. Sorensen has experienced it two
such losses in his thirty-seven years. (See PSI, p.2.)
As such, the information in this record reveals that more than simply "sympatiz[ing] with
you" because of those tragic circumstances, as the district court did, was necessary to adequately
address all the goals of sentencing in this case. (See Sentencing Tr., p.33, Ls.11-15.) Rather, a
proper consideration of Mr. Sorensen's entire character and situation reveals a more lenient
sentence, one based on terms designed to actually evaluate Mr. Sorensen's mental condition and
craft a treatment plan that would actually address all his underlying issues, such that a more
sustained pattern of rehabilitation could be initiated, would have better served all the goals of
sentencing, most particularly rehabilitation and protection of society.

9

That such rehabilitation remams possible is further evidenced by the fact that
Mr. Sorensen expressed remorse and accept responsibility for his actions.

(See PSI, p.6;

Sentencing Tr., p.18, Ls. 6-7, p.19, Ls.1-10.) That is actually revealed by his agreement to pay
restitution for a dismissed charge. See I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f); State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889
(Ct. App. 1988). Accepting responsibility and expressing remorse are critical first steps toward
rehabilitation.

See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). Therefore, a more

lenient sentence, one which actually took all those factors into consideration, would have better
served all the goals of sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Sorensen respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court
either reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or else, remand this case for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 17th day of October, 2019.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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